UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-7-2014

State v. Eauclaire Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41766

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Eauclaire Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41766" (2014). Not Reported. 1791.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1791

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
MITCHELL EAUCLAIRE,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 41766

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN
District Judge

HEIDI TOLMAN
Deputy Ada County Public Defender
I.S.B. # 8648
200 W. Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-287-7400

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

FILED .. COPY
MAY - 7 2014

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I

,}

,/,,~

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. .ii
STATEMENT OF TI-IE CASE ........................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings ....................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts .............................................................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 5
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 18
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................................... 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

I
I

I
I
I
I
I

PAGES

CASES

Apprendi v. New Jersey
530 U.S. 466 (2000) ........................................................................................................5
Chapman v. California
3 86 U.S. 18 ( 1967) .......................................................................................................... 12
Duncan v. Louisiana
391 U.S. 14 5 ( 1968) ....................................................................................................... 6
In re Winship
397 U.S. 358 (1970) ....................................................................................................... 5
People v. Ehlert
811 N.E.2d 620 (Ill. 2004)............................................................................................. 6
State v. Campbell
104 Idaho 705,662 P.2d 1149 (Ct.App.1983L ........................................................... 6

I

State v. Crawford
130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct.App.1997} ............................................................... 5,6,8

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

State v. Faught
127 Idaho 873, 908 P.2d 961 (Ct.App.1995L ............................................................. 6

I

State v. Felder
150 Idaho 269,245 P.3d 1021 (Ct.App.2010} ............................................................ J6
State v. Field
144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007)............................................................................ .16
State v. Green
100 Idaho 464,600 P.2d 140(1979)
State v. Gross
146 Idaho 15, 189 P .3d 477 (Ct.App.2008} ................................................................ J 6, 17
State v. Grantham
146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct.App.2008L ............................................................ J6
State v. Mitchell
130 Idaho 134, 93 7 P .2d 960 (Ct.App.1997) ................................................................6

ii

I
I
I

I
I

I
I
I

I

State v. Ojeda
119 Idaho 862, 810 P .2d 1148 (Ct.App.1991 }..............................................................9
State v. Perry
150 Idaho 209, 245 P .3d 961 (2010) ............................................................................ -12
State v. Phillips
144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct.App.2007} ................................................................ J5
State v. Row
131 Idaho 303, 955 P .2d 1082 (1998} ......................................................................... J 6
State v. Sandoval-Tena
138 Idaho 908, 71 P .3d 105 5 (2003) ........................................................................... 12
State v. Urquhart
105 Idaho 92,665 P.2d 1102 (Ct.App.1983} ............................................................. J2
State v. Warden
97 Idaho 752, 554 P.2d 684 (1976)............................................................................... 7,8
State v. Wheeler
149 Idaho 364,233 P.3d 1286 (Ct.App.2010} ............................................................ J5
United States v. Mckoy
771 F.2d 1207 (9 th Cir.1985) ......................................................................................... 15
United States v. Necoechea
986 F .2d 1273 (9 th Cir.1993) ........................................................................................ ..15
United States v. Simtob
901 F.2d 799 (9 th Cir.1990) .......................................................................................... .15, 17
United States v. Weatherspoon
410 F.3d 1142 (9 th Cir.2005) ......................................................................................... 15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

I
I
I
I

I.C.R. 29.l ....................................................................................................................... 12,13,14
IRPC 3.4

14

IRPC 3.8

14

iii

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
JI

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on June 6, 2013; at which time Mr. Eauclaire was
convicted of Possession of Paraphernalia. Mr. Eauclaire filed his Notice of Appeal on July 5,
2013; an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 23, 2013; finally the Second Amended Notice of
Appeal on August 13, 2013. The District Court heard argument and took the matter under
advisement.

The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the

conviction on January 2, 2014, and Mr. Eauclaire now timely appeals.
On appeal, Mr. Eauclaire asserts the following: 1) that there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: A) Mr. Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of
paraphernalia or physical control over it; and B) Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use the
paraphernalia to ingest a controlled substance, and 2) that the trial court erred by failing to grant
a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct which occurred when the prosecutor declared Mr.
Eauclaire a liar and vouched for the credibility of the States witnesses.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mitchell Eauclaire is a subcontractor through Pacific Home and Patio; as part of his
employment he must participate in random drug tests. (08/1/13 Tr., p.71, Ls.18-19). Mitchell
uses his truck for work purposes and has taken it to many job sites and many other individuals
have access to his truck. (08/1/13 Tr., p.80. Ls.4-20).

Mitchell also works full-time at Jimmy

Johns during the winter months, when construction is slow in order to make a living. (08/1/13
Tr., p.79, Ls.11-15). Mitchell also goes camping a lot with his truck and those that go camping
with him also have access to his truck and the unlocked toolbox which sits in the bed of the
truck. (08/1/13 Tr., p.75. Ls.17-25). He admittedly used marijuana occasionally in the past, but

1

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

stopped when he graduated from high school, three years ago, in order to keep his job and take
care of his responsibilities such as rent, bills and a girlfriend. (08/1/13 Tr., p. 72, Ls.2-18).
On February 23, 2013 Trooper Brandon Bake of the Idaho State Police stopped to assist a
stranded motorist. (08/1/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-10). Trooper Bake then walked up to the vehicle to
talk to the two passengers that were inside and thought that he smelled marijuana. (08/1/13 Tr.,
p.8, Ls.13-18). The passengers explained that they had run out of gas and that the driver had
gone to get gas (08/1/13 Tr., p.9, Ls. 14-16). Trooper Bake asked what kind of assistance was
needed and if there was any marijuana in the vehicle to which the passengers responded that
there was not after which he called Officer Plaisted for a canine assist. (08/1/13 Tr. p.11, Ls. 19). The driver, Mr. Eauclaire, later showed up with a gas can and talked to Trooper Bake.
(08/1/13 Tr. p.10, Ls. 1-4).
On February 23, 2013 Officer Marshall Plaisted of the Boise Police Department was
contacted by Trooper Bake to assist with the traffic stop. (08/1/13 Tr., p.44, Ls.23-24). When he
arrived at the scene, Officer Plaisted walked his canine around the car checking for any sign of
drugs. (08/1/13 Tr., p.45, L.25-p.46, L.1 ). Office Plaisted believed he smelled the odor of fresh
marijuana as he approached the vehicle. (08/1/13 Tr., p.52, Ls.1-3). It is of note that no
marijuana was discovered in the vehicle. (08/1/13 Tr., p 52, Ls.10-15 - p.55, Ls. 7-12). Officer
Plaisted also stated that he knew from experience and training the difference between the smell
of fresh marijuana and burnt marijuana. (08/1/13 Tr., p.53, Ls. 12-25-p. 54, Ls. 1-24). The
canine alerted to the door of the vehicle on the passenger side, along the door seal up to the
handle and right below it. (08/1/13 Tr., p.57, Ls. 21-25

p.59, Ls. 21-23).

After the canine alerted to the vehicle, Trooper Bake and Officer Plaisted began
searching the vehicle. (08/1/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.13-14.) During the ten minute search of the cab
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nothing illegal was discovered. (08/1/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.16-19.) Trooper Bake then got into the
bed of the truck and began searching the unblocked toolbox area. (08/1/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.20-25.)
After looking for a while and moving several items in the toolbox, Trooper Bake found a small
glass multicolored pipe in the unlocked toolbox on the driver's side. (08/1/13 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-10).
The pipe was not warm or smoking, there was no evidence of recent use, and the pipe was never
sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for testing. (08/1/13 Tr., p.35, Ls. 23-25-p.36, Ls.
1-9). Nothing else illegal was ever discovered in the vehicle, including marijuana. (08/1/13 Tr.,
p.37, Ls. 8-10).
Trooper Bake then asked whose pipe it was to which Mr. Eauclaire responded, "Pipe?
Under the tool box?" in a surprised manner. (08/1/13 Tr., p.36. Ls.15-20). Trooper Bake then
asked whose pipe it was again after finding nothing else during the search to which Mr.
Eauclaire responded "Well, it is probably mine from a long time ago, Could have been there for
several years." (08/1 /l 3 Tr., p.3 7, Ls.8-15). Other than that statement there was no indication
that Mr. Eauclaire knew that the pipe was there, that he had been using it or that it had been used
more recently than several years ago or even what the burnt residue inside the pipe was. (08/1/13
Tr., p.37, Ls. 24-25 -p. 38, Ls. 1-22).
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ISSUES

I.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: A) Mr.
Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of paraphernalia or physical control over it;
and B) Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use paraphernalia to ingest a
controlled substance?

II.

Did the trial court err by not granting a mistrial when the State engaged in misconduct
by declaring Mr. Eauclaire a liar and vouching for the credibility of the State's
witnesses which deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That: 1) Mr. Eauclaire
Had Knowledge Of The Presence Of Paraphernalia Or Physical Control Over It; 2) Mr. Eauclaire
Had The Requisite Intent To Use Paraphernalia To Ingest A Controlled Substance.
A.

Introduction
Mr. Eauclaire asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of

paraphernalia. Specifically, there was no evidence presented proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of paraphernalia, that Mr. Eauclaire was in
possession of paraphernalia and that Mr. Eauclaire possessed paraphernalia with the requisite
intent to use it to ingest a controlled substance.
B.

Standard of Review
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of

conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal where there is
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 594, 944 P.2d 727, 729 (Ct. App. 1997). A reasonable trier of
fact could not have found that the prosecution in this case sustained its burden of proving that
Mr. Eauclaire knew or should have known of the existence of the paraphernalia, exercised
control and dominion over it or had the required intent to use.
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle.

See In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt
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standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N .E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004 ).
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that:
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution .
Id. at 594-595, 944 P.2d at 729-730 (citations omitted).

In State v. Mitchell, 13 0 Idaho 134, 93 7 P .2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that,
"[ e]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961.
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The
defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant."
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995).

On appeal, it is clear the Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the
Jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 718-19, 662 P.2d
1149, 1162-63 (Ct.App.1983).
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1. There is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of paraphernalia or physical
control over it.
Mr. Eauclaire asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of
paraphernalia. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knew of the pipe's presence. Knowledge is a required element of the crime that the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
For example, in State v. Warden, there was no record of competent and substantial
evidence to support the verdict of conviction on the charge of possession of a controlled
substance. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 754, 554 P.2d 684, 686 (1976). In that case, at the
time of the entry of the officers into the bedroom no burning substance was observed, no person
at any location in the trailer house was seen to be in actual possession of anything which was or
appeared to be a controlled substance and no admissions or statements of any kind were made by
any persons admitting or inferring the possession of a controlled substance. Id. The charge of
possession was based on the fact that the defendant had occupied the trailer prior to his arrest and
thus was in possession of the premises where the controlled substance was found. Id.
Much like this case, Mr. Eauclaire was not the exclusive user of the truck and therefore
there can be no legitimate inference that he knew of the paraphernalia and had control of it since
there are no other circumstances or incriminating statements that would support it. The
statements made consisted of a surprised statement of "Pipe? In the toolbox?" and a statement
that Mr. Eauclaire assumed that since it was in his truck it must be his but if it was it was from
many years ago. (08/1/13 Tr., p.36. Ls.15-20.- Tr., p.37, Ls.8-15.) This does not support the
requirement that Mr. Eauclaire knew of its presence and had physical control over it, or had the
power and intention to control it. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
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evidence which was introduced at trial was that at some time, years ago, Mr. Eauclaire may have
used or known about the pipe.
Conversely, where there is additional evidence presented that tends to establish the
defendant's constructive possession such as proof of residency and marijuana and various drugrelated paraphernalia found in common areas to which the defendant had access there may be
sufficient evidence. State v. Greene, 100 Idaho 464, 466, 600 P.2d 140, 142 (1979). In Greene,
the defendant demonstrated some knowledge of the presence of the drugs and of their illegal
nature when he stated that "he knew about the marijuana, but he didn't know anything about the
heroin." This incriminating statement could justify a jury making the reasonable inference that
Greene knew of the marijuana and had control of it.
Finally, "Evidence that a defendant has a possessory interest in premises on which drugs
are found has often been held to establish possession of an illegal or controlled substance."
However, where the defendant is in non-exclusive possession of the premises upon which drugs
were found there can be no legitimate inference that he knew of the drugs and had control of
them in the absence of other circumstances such as incriminating statements which tend to
support such inference. Warden, 97 Idaho at 754, 554 P.2d at 686.
However, in State v. Crawford, there was substantial evidence that although the
defendant may not have been in exclusive possession of her residence, she did have exclusive
possession of her bedroom since there is an assumption that bedrooms are usually private areas
of the house indicating sole occupancy. Therefore, in that case, the court concluded that the jury's
verdict of guilty on the charge of possession of controlled substance was supported by sufficient
evidence. Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595, 944 P.2d at 730.
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There is no such sufficient evidence in this case due to the fact that a truck is not
considered to be a private area and many other people other than the defendant had access to the
truck. Mr. Eauclaire stated that he uses the truck as a work vehicle that many people have access
too. He also explained that he goes camping a lot with his truck and those that go camping have
access to his truck as well. Mr. Eauclaire was not the only person with access to the vehicle and
there is no evidence that shows that Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite dominion and control over
the paraphernalia.
Mr. Eauclaire asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he knew or
should have known that he was in possession of paraphernalia. A conviction cannot be based on
circumstantial evidence where such evidence is capable of explanation by a reasonable
hypothesis consistent with innocence. Mr. Eauclaire further argues that there was no evidence
from which the jury in his case could draw reasonable and justifiable inferences of guilt. State v.
Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862,810 P.2d 1148 (Ct.App.1991).

In this case, any statements made by Mr. Eauclaire could not amount to admissions that
would justify an inference of possession of paraphernalia with the intent to use. During the ten
minute search of the cab nothing illegal was discovered. After looking for a while and moving
several items in the toolbox, Trooper Bake found a small glass multicolored pipe buried in the
toolbox on the driver's side. The pipe was not warm or smoking, there was no evidence of
recent use, and the pipe was never sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for testing.
Nothing else illegal was ever discovered in the vehicle, including marijuana. There is no
evidence that Mr. Eauclaire knew or should have known that there was a pipe buried in the
toolbox of his truck. There was nothing else illegal. There was no evidence of any marijuana or
other paraphernalia on Mr. Eauclaire' s person or in his truck. Many other people could
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potentially have had access to the unlocked toolbox of his truck and there was not substantial
testimony which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to infer that Mr. Eauclaire knew or should
have known of the presence of paraphernalia.
2. There is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use paraphernalia to ingest a
controlled substance.
Mr. Eauclaire asserts there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of
paraphernalia. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he had intent to use the paraphernalia for the purpose of inhaling or otherwise introducing
into the body a controlled substance. Intent is a required element of the crime that the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, there was no testimony presented which would lead a
reasonable trier of fact to come to that conclusion.
In this case the evidence which was presented at trial included testimony from Trooper
Brandon Bake an Idaho State Trooper who testified that he was the officer who conducted the
initial traffic stop. He conducted the traffic stop to inquire if the stranded car required any
assistance. Trooper Bake believed he smelled the odor of marijuana so he contacted Officer
Marshall Plaisted of the Boise Police Department to assist with the traffic stop.
Officer Plaisted stated that when he arrived at the scene, he believed he smelled the odor
of fresh marijuana. Officer Plaisted also stated that he knew from experience and training the
difference between the smell of fresh marijuana and burnt marijuana. The only illegal item that
was found was the small pipe. No marijuana burnt or fresh was discovered. Officer Plaisted
walked his canine around the car checking for any sign of drugs. Both officers searched the cab
of the vehicle and found nothing. The canine alerted to the passenger side door seal and the
officers began searching the area where they again found nothing. A search of the toolbox in the

fl
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bed of the vehicle revealed a small glass pipe buried under several items on the driver's side of
the toolbox. Trooper Bake then asked whose pipe it was again after finding nothing else during
the search to which Mr. Eauclaire responded "Well, it is probably mine from a long time ago,
could have been there for several years." Other than that statement there was no evidence that
Mr. Eauclaire knew that the pipe was there, that he had been using it or had any intent to use it or
even what the burnt residue inside was. The pipe was not warm or smoking, there was no
evidence of recent use and the pipe was never sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for
testing. No substantial and competent evidence as to what residue was in the pipe was ever
admitted. One officer testified as to the odor of fresh marijuana, the other officer testified that
there is no difference between fresh marihuana and burnt marijuana, there was not even enough
residue to NIK test the substance to affirm officer's suspicions.
There was not substantial testimony which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to infer
that Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use the paraphernalia for the purpose of inhaling or
otherwise introducing into the body a controlled substance. In order for there to be sufficient
evidence for the jury to find Mr. Eauclaire guilty of possession of paraphernalia, there would
have had to have been more evidence such as finding actual marijuana in the vehicle or finding
the paraphernalia on his person or at least hot and smoking. The evidence was not sufficient for
the jury to find Mr. Eauclaire guilty of possession of paraphernalia.
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II.

The Trial Court Erred By Not Granting A Mistrial When The State Engaged In Misconduct By
Declaring Mr. Eauclaire A Liar And Vouching For The Credibility Of The States Witnesses
Which Deprived The Defendant Of His Right To A Fair Trial.
A.

Introduction
Mr. Eauclaire was arrested for possession of paraphernalia on February 23, 2013. Mr.

Eauclaire asserts that the trial court erred by failing to reasonably exercise its discretion when it
failed to grant a mistrial after the state conducted sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to warrant
the granting of a Rule 29.1 Motion for Mistrial by declaring the defendant a liar and vouching for
the credibility of the States witnesses during the closing statements.
B.

Standard of Review
The question on appeal is whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in

light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. State v, Sandoval-Tena, 138

'

I
'

,""1

Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003). The court is to examine whether the event that
precipitated the motion constituted reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Id. The focus should be upon the ultimate impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the

mistrial motion. The trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that event,
viewed retrospectively, amounted to reversible error. State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665
P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct.App.1983). An error is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing
court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227,

245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
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The trial court erred when it declined to grant the defense motion for mistrial, because the
trial court failed to reasonably exercise its discretion in light of circumstances existing
when the mistrial motion was made; after the state conducted sufficient prosecutorial
misconduct by vouching for the credibility of witnesses during the closing statements.
Mr. Eauclaire contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct and the judge failed to

reasonably exercise its discretion in light of circumstances existing when the motion for mistrial
was made. Defense counsel raised a motion for mistrial regarding the misconduct of vouching
for the credibility of witnesses. That colloquy proceeded as follows:
(Closing Arguments)
MR. BOOKER: " ... You've heard a very convenient chain of story from the
defendant today. On the date that this happened, you heard the defendant was
minimizing his involvement. You heard a defendant who said, "Probably mine from a
long time ago," minimizing his involvement because he knows he's just about to get
busted for possessing drug paraphernalia. Today you heard the defendant straight out
lie."
" ... And I'll say to be fair, you have to judge the credibility of the officer as well,
whether he was truthful or not as well. And I'll argue that the officers were absolutely
truthful."
MS. TOLMAN: Objection, Judge. Improper argument.
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.
MR. BOOKER: The credibility is going to be the central part of your determination
today as to whether this defendant did, in fact, commitTHE COURT: And, counsel, I need to-I just need to make a comment to the jury.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are the fact finders in this case. Your job is to
determine the credibility of the witness. That is your purview alone. You may
continue, Mr. Booker.
(08/1/13 Tr., p.101, Ls.9 -17 p.102, Ls.9 -25)(emphasis added)
(Jury Out)
After the jury retired to deliberate, Mr. Eauclaire asked for a Rule 29.1 motion for a mistrial and
the issue was discussed as follows:

'

I
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MS. TOLMAN: For purposes of creating a record for appeal, Judge, I'm going to ask
at this time for a Rule 29 .1 motion for a mistrial. On motion of defendant, a mistrial
may be declared when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the
proceedings or conduct inside or outside the courtroom which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.
I believe the State made absolutely very improper statements during closing
arguments with regard to vouching for the credibility of their officers saying I submit
to you they're telling the truth ....
THE COURT: Mr. Booker, response?
MR. BOOKER: Your Honor, the State would just say that the State said repeatedly
that it is - it is in the jury's purview. They are to determine credibility. And any
mistake that there could have been, whether there was or not, I would just argue that
it was corrected by the Court in the instruction given by the Court.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Booker. What I heard was Mr. Booker
indicating to the jury the gist of it, although I do not have the--don't recall the exact
words, were that the officers were testifying truthfully or you can believe the officers
because they were truthful. Ms. Tolman made a timely objection. The Court made a
curative instruction. I believe that that instruction was sufficient to remind the jury
not specifically that they were the fact finders, but specifically that they were the sole
judges of the credibility of the witnesses who testified. So I believe that that's
sufficient. I'm going to deny your motion ...
(08/1/13 Tr., p.123, Ls.3

16--p.124, Ls.14-25-p.125, Ls. 1-12.)(emphasis added)

"A mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which
is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.l(a). In this
case, the violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct was prejudicial to the defendant
and deprived him of a fair trial. IRPC 3 .4( e) states that a lawyer shall not: "in trial... state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a
civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused ... " IRPC RULE 3 .4. "A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice ... "
IRPC Rule 3.8. The prosecution violated these rules by vouching for the credibility of witnesses
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during his closing argument thereby disregarding the Bill of Rights and the right to a fair trial
enumerated therein.
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct.App.2007).
"Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury
and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369, 233 P.3d 1286, 1291
(Ct.App.2010). However, closing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phillips, 144
Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. "Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government
behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity, or suggesting that
information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony." United States v.
Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993).

More importantly, the possibility of prejudicial effect stemming from vouching is
increased in cases where credibility is of particular importance. United States v. Weatherspoon,
410 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir.2005). Vouching is particularly dangerous because a jury "may be
inclined to give weight to the prosecutor's opinion in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
instead of making the independent judgment of credibility to which the defendant is entitled."
United States v. McKay, 771 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.1985). Failures to correct the improper

statements at the time they were made cannot be salvaged by the later generalized jury
instruction reminding jurors that a lawyer's statements during closing argument do not constitute
evidence. United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir.1990).
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The standard for reviewing a court's denial of a motion for mistrial is well established.
"When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error supported by a
contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural or evidentiary error we review the
denial of a motion for mistrial for reversible error." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d
273, 285 (2007). The question on appeal is whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. The focus is
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively,
constituted reversible error. To be reversible error, the error must have misled the jury or
prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998).
When considering the denial of a motion for mistrial that arises out of argument, "the threshold
inquiry is whether the state introduced error." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d
128, 136 (Ct.App.2008). In this case, the prosecutor introduced error by vouching for the state's
witnesses during closing argument thereby misleading the jury into believing that the state was
vouching for their credibility which made it impossible for the jury to determine the evidence for
themselves in the course of a fair trial.
Relating the facts and urging the jury to reach a conclusion about credibility is acceptable
conduct, but stating personal opinions about credibility is misconduct. State v. Felder, 150 Idaho
269, 273, 245 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Ct. App. 2010). Statements about credibility come from
misrepresentations of evidence of facts not in evidence such as inconsistencies in the witness's
story that are not proven by evidence are also misconduct. Id. Generally, it may be improper to
label the defendant as a "liar," for testimony given in his or her defense. State v. Gross, 146
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Idaho 15, 18-19 (Ct. App. 2008). It is not misconduct, however, to refer to the defendant as a liar
if the defendant admitted to lying in connection with the case. Id.
For example, in Gross, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suggesting that the jury
"should trust and believe the officer and the prosecutor because they represented the state and,
therefore, must be ethical," because the comments were opinion and not based on the evidence
presented at trial. Id. The misconduct that took place in this case is similar. The prosecution not
only vouched for the officer's credibility but also stated that the defendant was not telling the
truth. Relating the facts and urging the jury to draw their own conclusion is proper, but that is
not what happened in this case. The State drew the conclusion for them by stating the defendant
lied and that his officers were being absolutely truthful. This conduct was improper and warrants
a mistrial due to the fact that the statements constitute reversible error because they misled the
jury into thinking that the state was affirmatively stating that they must believe the statements
made by officers and discredit those made by the defendant. The statements made during closing
arguments prejudiced the jury against the defendant in such a manner that the result of the trial
could not be fair disregarding the Bill of Rights, specifically the right to a fair trial thus
mandating a new trial.
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order held that "to the extent, if any,
that the prosecutor's comments were improper, in the Court's view, they were alleviated by
Judge Gardunia' s immediate admonition to the jury that they "are the fact finders in this case.
Your job is to determine the credibility of the witness. That is your purview alone." (R., p.134.)
However, many courts have routinely held that improper statements cannot be salvaged by later
generalized jury instructions. See United States v. Simtob, 90 I F.2d 799, (9th Cir.1990).
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It simply cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in allowing vouching
for the credibility of witnesses and calling the defendant a liar and then offering an ineffective
curative instruction did not contribute to the verdict.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Eauclaire respectfully requests that this court vacate
his judgment of conviction and his case be remanded for a new trial.

DATED this 7th day of May 2014.

Attorney for Defendant
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